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Abstract
It has been extensively shown in past literature that Bayesian Game
Theory and Quantum Non-locality have strong ties between them. Pure
Entangled States have been used, in both common and conflict interest
games, to gain advantageous payoffs, both at the individual and social
level. In this paper we construct a game for a Mixed Entangled State
such that this state gives higher payoffs than classically possible, both at
the individual level and the social level. Also, we use the I-3322 inequality
so that states that aren’t helpful as advice for Bell-CHSH inequality can
also be used. Finally, the measurement setting we use is a Restricted
Social Welfare Strategy (given this particular state).
1 Introduction
The quantum theory emerged when most of the physicists realized that physics
at the atomic level could not be completely described by classical mechanics.
Plank was the first to give the notion of ”quanta”, which was further devel-
oped by Einstein. Though Heisenberg and Bohr, the further creators of the
theory, believed in the innate uncertainty of the behaviour of atoms, Einstein
never accepted it. Einstein was always against the Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Thus Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen put forward the EPR
paradox in their paper in 1935 [1], that claimed quantum mechanics is incom-
plete,that is, it doesn’t provide a complete picture of the physical reality.
To resolve this, Einstein - Podolsky - Rosen introduced a Hidden Variable
Theory, in their paper , which according to them removed all the in-determinism
and accounted for the behaviour of the observables in quantum mechanics. This
led Bohr to publish a paper in the same journal under the same name, where he
stated that the criterion of physical reality given by EPR contains an essential
ambiguity when applied to quantum phenomenon [2]. Hence, there continued a
debate between Einstein and Bohr regarding the fundamental nature of reality.
But later, Bell formulated an inequality [3] which was satisfied by all local
realistic theories. Eventually, the quantum violation of Bell’s inequality proved
that no Local Realistic Hidden Variable Theory can exist from which quantum
mechanics can be derived. The value by which quantum mechanics violates a
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particular Bell Inequality is called the Tsirelson bound for that particular Bell
Inequality. The Tsirelson bound for Bell CHSH [4] is 2
√
2.
Quantum states that violate Bell’s inequality are all non-local states (entan-
gled). However this leads to the question:
Is Bell’s Inequality sufficient to show non-locality (or entanglement)
?
It turns out that Bell’s inequality is not sufficient to prove non-locality. The
states that violate Bell’s inequality are definitely non-local, but there are other
states that do not violate a particular bell inequality but are still non-local.
So in such cases, other inequalities are required which are inequivalent to this
inequality. In this paper, we have worked with one such inequality - the I3322
inequality [5].
2 Game Theory
Game theory is mathematical modeling of strategic interaction among rational
beings, used widely in economics [6] , political sciences [7] , biological phenomena
[8], as well as logic, computer science and psychology [9]. It is the study of human
conflict and cooperation, or in other words the study of optimal decision making
of different players, each with a set of action having particular payoffs.It is the
payoff which decides the preference of an action over another. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern [10] were the pioneers of game theory.
Game theory can be cooperative (common interest) or non-cooperative (con-
flict interest). Cooperative game includes competition between groups whereas
non-cooperative game includes analyzing strategies and payoffs of individual
players using the concept of Nash Equilibrium [11]. In a game if a player chooses
a unique action from a set of available action it is called pure strategy,but if
a probability distribution over a set of action is available it is called mixed
strategy.Nash proved that in any game with finite number of action for each
player there is always a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. Later the concept
of Bayesian Games i.e, games of Incomplete Information was introduced [12]
and Aumann proved the existance of correlated equilibria [13] in these games,
as opposed to Nash Equilibria.
3 Quantum Game Theory
3.1 Non-locality and Bayesian Game Theory
Non-locality is one of the most counter intuitive aspects of Quantum Mechanics.
The principle of locality states that an object can only be affected by it’s im-
mediate surroundings and not by remote or distant objects. However Quantum
theory is not consistent with this and is inherently non-local in nature, unlike the
rest of classical physics. For example, two entangled particles placed far apart,
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can display correlations inexplicable by classical physics. These correlations can
not be as a result of a signal transfer as that would imply superluminal com-
munication. On the other hand, in 1964, Bell [3] showed that these correlations
can not be as a result of pre-decided strategies either.
In 2013, Brunner and Linden [14] demonstrated strong links between Quan-
tum Nonlocality and Bayesian Game Theory. Specifically they showed that the
normal form of a Bayesian game is equivalent to a Bell Inequality test scenario.
They showed that when the two players in the game share non local resources
such as entangled pair of quantum particles, they can outperform players us-
ing any sort of classical resources. This can happen, for example, when the
payoff function of the players corresponds to a Bell Inequality, like the CHSH
inequality [4], as first discussed by Cheon and Iqbal [15] but also when the
payoff function doesn’t correspond to any Bell Inequality. They showed that
more generally, for Bayesian Games, Quantum Mechanics provides clear and
indisputable advantage over all classical resources.
3.2 Nonlocality in Conflict Interest Games
Brunner and Linden showed that Quantum Mechanics indeed provides an ad-
vantage over classical resources for all Bayesian Games, but the examples they
provided were all Common Interest Games (games where it is beneficial for both
the players to cooperate rather than oppose each other). In fact, until 2015, all
other known non local games, including the GHZ-Mermin game [16], the Bell-
CHSH game [4], and the Hidden Matching game [17, 18] were all examples of
Common Interest Games (mostly, because the average payoff functions for both
Alice and Bob were the same).
In 2015, however, Anna Pappa et al. [19] demonstrated that quantum advice
can offer an advantage compared to classical advice even in conflicting interest
games. They explicitly constructed an incomplete information game with con-
flicting interests, where quantum strategies yielded fair equilibria with average
payoffs strictly higher than those achievable by classical means, for both the
players.
3.3 Fair and Unfair Strategies
Classical equilibria can be of two types -
• Fair equilibria, where the average payoffs for both the players are equal,
and
• Unfair equilbria, where the payoffs for the players are unequal.
Up until 2016, most of the games (both Common Interest and Conflicting In-
terest) proposed, dealt with Fair equilibria - that is, they showed that quantum
fair payoffs surpass classical fair equilibrium payoffs. In 2016, Arup Roy, Amit
Mukherjee et al. [20] showed that quantum strategies can outperform not only
fair classical equilibrium strategies but unfair strategies too. They analytically
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characterized some non-local correlations, that would yield unfair average pay-
offs strictly higher than the classical ones in Anna Pappa’s game.
3.4 Social Welfare Solutions and Pure Entangled States
Until now, we’ve been talking about equilibria for individual players - that
is, states where the players can’t increase their payoffs further, by unilater-
ally changing their individual strategies. Such equilibria are called correlated
equilibria (as opposed to Nash Equilibria). Psychological factors indicate that
sometimes, instead of focusing solely on their individual payoffs, players may
also consider additional social goals - one such idea is the Social Welfare Solution
(SWS).
In such a strategy, players aim to maximize the sum of their individual
payoffs. Out of all the possible quantum strategies, the ones that increase the
sum of the payoffs (above the classical value) are called Quantum Social Welfare
Solution (Quantum-SWS) and the quantum state producing this strategy is
called Quantum Social Welfare Advice (Quantum-SWA).
In 2017, Manik Banik, Some Sankar Bhattacharya et al. [21] showed that
any two-qubit pure entangled state can act as Quantum-SWA for some Bayesian
Game. Hence given any pure entangled state between two qubits, there exists
at least one game where this state provides Quantum-SWS.
4 Mixed Entangled States and I3322 Inequality
The above discussion raises the question
Can Mixed Entangled States can be used as Quantum-SWA for
Bayesian Games?
We answer this question in the affirmative, by explicitly constructing a Bayesian
game, where a mixed entangled state gives higher unfair payoffs and higher social
payoffs than classical values.
4.1 The Premise
The setup is now changed - it is no more a 2-2-2 scenario. Now, there are 2
players with 3 possible questions (3 possible measurement settings) with 2 ac-
tions (or outcomes) to each question ∈ {0, 1}.
Let the players be A for Alice and B for Bob. They can be asked 3 questions,
each namely: {A1, A2, A3} and {B1, B2, B3}. Their answers (or outcomes) for
these are ∈ {0, 1}. So, P (x, y|Ai, Bj) refers to the probability that, when A is
asked Ai and B is asked Bj they reply x and y as answers, respectively, with
x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
First, we construct the classical game.
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4.2 The Classical Game
4.2.1 Classical Strategies
A classical strategy means A and B both locally predecide their answers to the
questions. For each question, A or B can answer either 0 or 1. So for the entire
set of 3 questions, there can be 23 = 8 different set of answers. Each such set of
answers is called a strategy for that particular player. For example if A answers
0 to all questions (that is 0 for A1, 0 for A2 and 0 for A3) then her answer
strategy is 000.
Strategies are named by considering the answer sequence (for A1, A2, A3
or B1, B2, B3, in this order) as a binary string and converting it into decimal.
So 000 becomes g0 and 010 becomes g2 and so on. So the strategies for each
individual player (A or B) are g0, g1, . . . g6, g7
4.2.2 Probability Boxes
The Probability Box (or local box) is a table of numbers, which shows the how
the strategy relates the questions to the answers. It shows for each question,
with what probability a player chooses a particular answer. There is a one to
one relation between the strategy ordered pair (gA, gB) and the probability box.
In this part, we use classical probability boxes, that is local boxes. Local
boxes respect locality, that is the probability that A gives a particular answer
to some question is independent of what B is asked and what his response is.
A general classical probability box looks takes the following form:
OO O1 1O 11
A1B1 C11 M1 − C11 N1 − C11 1−M1 −N1 + C11
A1B2 C12 M1 − C12 N2 − C12 1−M1 −N2 + C12
A1B3 C13 M1 − C13 N3 − C13 1−M1 −N3 + C13
A2B1 C21 M2 − C21 N1 − C21 1−M2 −N1 + C21
A2B2 C22 M2 − C22 N2 − C22 1−M2 −N2 + C22
A2B3 C23 M2 − C23 N3 − C23 1−M2 −N3 + C23
A3B1 C31 M3 − C31 N1 − C31 1−M3 −N1 + C31
A3B2 C32 M3 − C32 N2 − C32 1−M3 −N2 + C32
A3B3 C33 M3 − C33 N3 − C33 1−M3 −N3 + C33
Row AiBj and column xy represents probability of answering (x, y) for the
question AiBj , that is P (x, y|AiBj). It is easy to see that this is a local box,
since for example, the probability that A answers 0 to A1B1 is P (00|A1B1) +
P (01|A1B1) = M1 which is the same as the probability that A answers 0 to
A1B2 or A1B3, etc.So the probability that A given question A1 answers 0 is the
same independent of what question B is asked.
4.2.3 Utility Boxes
For a particular game each player chooses one out of these 8 strategies available
to them. While the strategy dictates the move or answer that the player gives
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upon being asked the question, the reward or payoff he gets from that answer is
described by the Utility Box. Given the pair of strategies that are being used,
the player’s individual payoffs can be calculated from the Utility Boxes.
A’s answers are listed along the columns and B’s along the rows. For a
question pair (x, y), the ordered pair (u1, u2) in row a and column b represents
the payoff A and B get, respectively, on answering with a and b. We designate
A’s reward as uA(a, b|x, y) := u1 and B’s as uB(a, b|x, y) := u2.
For questions A1B1, A1B2, A1B3
0 1
0 2
3
, 1 − 1
3
, 0
1 0, 1
3
0, 1
3
For questions A2B1 and A3B1
0 1
0 1
2
, 0 1
2
, 0
1 − 1
2
,−1 1
2
, 0
For questions A2B3 and A3B2
0 1
0 − 2
3
,− 1
3
1
3
, 2
3
1 1
3
, 2
3
1
3
, 2
3
For question A2B2
0 1
0 1
3
, 2
3
1
3
, 2
3
1 − 2
3
,− 1
3
1
3
, 2
3
For question A3B3
0 1
0 0, 0 − 1
3
, 1
3
1 1
3
,− 1
3
0, 0
4.2.4 Classical Payoffs
For each pair of strategy (gA, gB) that Alice and Bob choose, they each get a
particular payoff or reward.
Payoff for a particular question is calculated by using the strategy (Prob-
ability Box) to find the player’s answer and then using the utility box to find
the corresponding payoff. Average payoff is the average of the individual payoff
over all possible questions.
FA =
∑
a,b,x,y
p(x, y)P (a, b|x, y)uA(a, b, x, y)
FB =
∑
a,b,x,y
p(x, y)P (a, b|x, y)uB(a, b, x, y)
Where, p(x, y) is the probability that the question pair (x, y) is asked.
In our game, we assume each question is equally likely to be asked, then
p(x, y) = 1
N2
∀(x, y) where N is the number of questions. Here, there are 3
questions for each party (A1, A2, A3 or B1, B2, B3). So, p(x, y) =
1
9
∀x, y.
The classical payoffs, using the Probability Box for p(a, b|x, y) and the Utility
Boxes for uA and uB, are then:
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FA =
1
9
(C11 + C12 + C13 + C21 + C31 − C23 − C32 + C22
−M1 − 2N1 −N2 − M3
3
+
N3
3
+ 2)
FB =
1
9
(C11 + C12 + C13 + C21 + C31 − C23 − C32 + C22
−M1 − 2N1 −N2 + M3
3
− N3
3
+ 3)
The Cij ,Mi, Nj values (∈ {0, 1} for classical strategies) are decided by the
strategies gi. Also, since the expressions for FA and FB are different, the payoffs
are unfair.
4.2.5 Classical Equilibria
Since each of the players has a choice of 8 different strategies (g0, g1, . . . g7), the
final payoff box is a 8 × 8 table, with the first entry being the payoff for Alice
and the second one being the payoff for Bob. A factor of 1
27
has been ignored
in the table, to keep things cleaner.
g0 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7
g0 6, 9 5, 10 6, 9 5, 10 3, 6 2, 7 3, 6 2, 7
g1 7, 8 6, 9 4, 5 3, 6 7, 8 6, 9 4, 5 3, 6
g2 3, 6 -1, 4 6, 9 2, 7 3, 6 -1, 4 6,9 2,7
g3 4, 5 0, 3 4, 5 0, 3 7, 8 3, 6 7, 8 3, 6
g4 0, 3 2, 7 3, 6 5, 10 0, 3 2, 7 3, 6 5, 10
g5 1, 2 3, 6 1, 2 3, 6 4, 5 6, 9 4, 5 6, 9
g6 -3, 0 -4, 1 3, 6 2, 7 0, 3 -1, 4 6, 9 5, 10
g7 -2, -1 -3, 0 1, 2 0, 3 4, 5 3, 6 7, 8 6, 9
The equilibria (all are biased / unfair) have been shaded yellow. These are
the stable states for this game. Also, social welfare solution payoff is (15
27
, 15
27
).
Our next task is to check whether a quantum strategy can increase payoffs of
the individual parties above the classical values.
4.3 The Quantum Game
Now, we devise a means to play this game using a quantum state. In this sce-
nario the two players share a Mixed Entangled State. They are asked questions
A1, A2, A3 and B1, B2, B3 respectively, and they get their answer by performing
suitable measurements on the shared state. The objective is to generate a payoff
for both players, that exceeds the classical equilibrium payoffs.
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We do this by implanting a quantum inequality in the payoff function so
that quantum processes can exceed the upper bound for classical processes and
hence produce payoffs higher than all classical payoffs.
4.3.1 The Inequality
We choose the I-3322 inequality. This inequality was discovered in 2003 by
Daniel Collins and Nicolas Gisin [5], but little work was done on it, other than
finding it’s maximal violation value using infinite dimensional quantum systems
in 2010 [22].
The important thing about this inequality is that it is inequivalent to the
Bell-CHSH inequality. This means that there are states that don’t violate Bell-
CHSH inequality but violate this.
The inequality is usually represented in the following way:
-1 0 0
-2 1 1 1
-1 1 1 -1
0 1 -1 0
where the numbers correspond to the coefficients of:
P (A1) P (A2) P (A3)
P (B1) P (A1B1) P (A2B1) P (A3B1)
P (B2) P (A1B2) P (A2B2) P (A3B2)
P (B3) P (A1B3) P (A2B3) P (A3B3)
in the inequality. Here, for succinctness, we write P (00|AiBj) as P (AiBj)
and P (0|Ai) as P (Ai).
Rewriting the inequality in a form closer to that of the CHSH inequality, we
get
S = −1
3
P (01|A1B1)− 2
3
P (10|A1B1) + 1
3
P (00|A1B2)− 1
3
P (01|A1B2)
−1
3
P (10|A1B2) + 2
3
P (00|A1B3)− 1
3
P (01|A1B3) + 1
3
P (00|A2B1)
−2
3
P (10|A2B1) + 2
3
P (00|A2B2)− 1
3
P (10|A2B2)− P (00|A2B3)
+
1
3
P (00|A3B1)− 2
3
P (10|A3B1)− 4
3
P (00|A3B2)− 1
3
P (10|A3B2)
And then plugging in the variables from the Probability Box gives
S = C11 + C12 + C13 + C21 + C22 − C23 + C31 − C32 −M1 − 2N1 −N2
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4.3.2 Maximum Violation of the Inequality
For all classical systems, I-3322 satisfies S ≤ 0. For quantum mechanical systems
however, a numerical optimization suggests that the maximum value is 0.25 [5].
The same is suggested by another approach using infinite dimensional quantum
systems [22].
The state that produces this maximum value is the Maximally Entangled
Bell State |Ψ−〉: ∣∣Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)
Choosing appropriate measurements for A and B, gives the value of the
inequality S|Ψ−〉 = 0.25.
Also, since FA+FB =
1
9
(2S + 5), and this state gives the maximum possible
value of S, this state is automatically the Social Welfare Solution for this game.
However, since this inequality is in-equivalent to the Bell-CHSH inequality,
there exist states that violate this inequality but not the Bell-CHSH inequality.
We choose one such Mixed Entangled State and corresponding measurements,
with the aim to increase the payoffs beyond classical limits.
4.3.3 The Quantum State
The state shared between the A and B is the following mixed entangled state:
ρAB = 0.85 |Φ〉 〈Φ|+ 0.15 |01〉 〈01|
where
|Φ〉 = 1√
5
(2 |00〉+ |11〉)
The Density Matrix for state ρAB is:
ρAB =


0.68 0 0 0.34
0 0.15 0 0
0 0 0 0
0.34 0 0 0.17


4.3.4 The Measurements
The 6 questions in the classical game have their corresponding measurements for
the quantum version. These are all projective measurements, specified by their
polar and azimuthal angles (θ, φ). The probabilities for these measurements
are calculated by applying the density matrix of the proper eigenvalue of the
measurement operator on the density matrix of the quantum state and then
taking trace.
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A1 ≡ (η, 0)
A2 ≡ (−η, 0)
A3 ≡ (−pi
2
, 0)
B1 ≡ (−χ, 0)
B2 ≡ (χ, 0)
B3 ≡ (pi
2
, 0)
such that cos η =
√
7
8
and cosχ =
√
2
3
.
Applying the measurements, with the appropriate eigenvalues, we can find
out all the elements of the probability box:
M1 = 0.808687, M2 = 0.808687, M3 = 0.5
N1 = 0.646969, N2 = 0.646969, N3 = 0.5
C11 = 0.576785, C12 = 0.646188, C13 = 0.464447,
C21 = 0.646188, C22 = 0.576785, C23 = 0.344239,
C31 = 0.421634, C32 = 0.225335, C33 = 0.08
4.3.5 Quantum Payoffs
The quantum payoffs are then calculated using the same formulas as those for
classical payoffs:
FA =
1
9
(C11 + C12 + C13 + C21 + C31 − C23 − C32 + C22
−M1 − 2N1 −N2 − M3
3
+
N3
3
+ 2)
=
6.03858
27
FB =
1
9
(C11 + C12 + C13 + C21 + C31 − C23 − C32 + C22
−M1 − 2N1 −N2 + M3
3
− N3
3
+ 3)
=
9.03858
27
The quantum payoff value (6.03858
27
, 9.03858
27
) is greater than the classical equi-
librium value ( 6
27
, 9
27
).
Also, the social welfare value 15.0772
27
exceeds that for all classical equilibria(
15
27
)
.
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5 Conclusion
We have, hence, constructed a game where a mixed entangled state provides
higher individual payoffs than the classical equilibria. The social welfare payoff
is also increased beyond the upper limit for the classical scenario.
Finally, if we restrict the advice that the referee gives to the players as this
particular mixed state, the measurement setting chosen maximizes the Social
Welfare Value. Hence, it can be thought of as a Restricted Social Welfare
Solution.
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